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SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN-
WASHINGTON'S NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTION
In 1982, the Washington state legislature adopted a new exception to
the hearsay rule,' which applies in criminal prosecutions for sexual abuse
of children. 2 This new exception is Washington's first hearsay exception
that gives the trial court discretion to determine whether an out-of-court
statement is trustworthy. 3 Under the exception, a statement made by a
1. Washington's hearsay rule is set forth in WASH. R. EVIO. 802, which provides: "Hearsay is
not admissible except as provided by these rules, by other court rules, or by statute."
"Hearsay" is defined in WASH. R. EviD. 801(c) as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."
2. Act of April 1, 1982, ch. 129, § 2, 1982 Wash. Laws 481 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.44.120 (1982)). The exception provides:
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact
performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is
admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings in the courts of the state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time,
content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, That when the child is unavailable as a witness,
such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act.
A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the statement
makes known to the adverse party his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the
statement sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
Read literally, the new exception could be construed to apply in any criminal proceeding rather
than only in a proceeding for the crime described in the child's statement. It is unlikely that the
legislature intended this result. The new exception would, under this construction, be in direct con-
flict with the Washington Rules of Evidence that provide for the exclusion of irrelevant or unduly
prejudicial evidence and character evidence. See WASH. R. EvID. 402, 403, 404(b). The new excep-
tion and the existing rules of evidence can and should be harmonized by construing the new exception
to apply only to criminal proceedings for the act of sexual misconduct described in the child's out-of-
court statement. See State v. Zornes, 78 Wn. 2d 9, 15, 475 P.2d 109, 114 (1970) ("Where two
statutes apply to the same subject matter,... the two statutes will be reconciled if possible so that
effect can be given to each."); In Re Horse Heaven Irrigation Dist., 11 Wn. 2d 218, 226, 118 P.2d
972, 976 (1941) ("The courts . . . are not controlled by the literal meaning of the language of the
statute . . .[and] no construction should be given to a statute, which leads to gross injustice or
absurdity.").
3. All other exceptions specify circumstances that are thought to indicate the trustworthiness of
the statement. See WASH. R. EvID. 803-804; infra Part IA. In applying these defined exceptions, the
trial judge merely determines whether the out-of-court statement offered was made under the speci-
fied circumstances. He or she does not weigh the trustworthiness of the statement.
The statement against interest exception gives the trial judge limited discretion to evaluate the
trustworthiness of hearsay statements in that it requires both a finding of specified circumstances and
a judicial determination that additional unspecified circumstances indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement. See WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (statement against interest that tends to expose the declarant
Washington Law Review
child under ten years of age describing an act of sexual contact performed
with or on the child by another is admissible if several conditions are met.
First, the child must either testify at the proceeding or be unavailable as a
witness. Second, the court must find, in a hearing conducted outside the
presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement provide "sufficient indicia of reliability." Third, if the child is
unavailable as a witness, there must be corroborative evidence of the act
of sexual contact described in the statement. Finally, the prosecution
must notify the defendant of its intention to offer the statement far enough
in advance of the proceeding so that the defendant has a fair opportunity
to prepare a defense to the statement.
Part I of this Comment evaluates the new hearsay exception as a rule of
evidence. It concludes that the exception is an appropriate solution to the
special hearsay problems that arise in child sexual abuse cases. Part II
considers whether the exception violates the accused's constitutional right
to confront the witnesses against him or her. It concludes that the excep-
tion is not unconstitutional per se, although specific applications of the
exception may be unconstitutional.
I. THE NEW EXCEPTION AS A RULE OF EVIDENCE
A. The Development of Discretionary Hearsay Exceptions
The major rationale underlying the hearsay rule is that accuracy and
trustworthiness can best be tested by cross-examination. 4 Exceptions to
the hearsay rule traditionally have been based on the premise that certain
circumstances so strongly indicate the accuracy of a speaker's perception,
memory, and narration that little or nothing would be gained by cross-
examining him or her. 5 The presumed reliability of statements made
under such circumstances is considered an adequate substitute for cross-
examination. 6
Courts developed the traditional hearsay exceptions by identifying spe-
to criminal liability and that is offered to exculpate the accused is admissible only if "corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement").
4. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (3d ed. 1940). Other reasons that have been advanced in sup-
port of the hearsay rule are that the witness's presence at trial allows the jury to observe his or her
demeanor as an aid in evaluating the witness's sincerity and that a witness is less likely to lie when
under oath. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 245 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)
Ihereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
5. J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, §§ 1420-23. Necessity has also been a factor in deciding whether
to make an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. § 1420. Necessity alone, however, has not generally
been deemed a sufficient basis for creating an exception to the hearsay rule. Rather, some circumstan-
tial indication of trustworthiness has almost always been required. Id.
6. J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1422.
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cific circumstances thought to guarantee trustworthiness. 7 In addition,
most jurisdictions recognized the power of judges to make exceptions to
the hearsay rule for reliable evidence that did not meet the specific cir-
cumstantial requirements of any traditional exception. 8
In 1975, Congress codified the traditional hearsay exceptions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 Congress included two exceptions in the
Federal Rules that allow a federal judge to admit evidence that does not
meet the requirements of any defined hearsay exception if the judge deter-
mines that it has "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness." 10 These discretionary exceptions were intended to supplement the
defined exceptions in the same manner as the common law power to make
discretionary hearsay determinations had previously supplemented the
traditional exceptions. 11
Discretionary hearsay exceptions have been the subject of much de-
bate. 12 Proponents of discretionary exceptions argue that these exceptions
are desirable for several reasons. First, strict adherence to technical,
7. Id.; Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 239, 243-47 (1978). These circumstances fall into the following
categories: (1) circumstances in which a sincere and accurate statement would naturally be uttered;
(2) circumstances in which the danger of easy detection or the fear of punishment would counteract
any desire to falsify; and (3) circumstances in which any error in the statement would probably be
detected and corrected. J. WIGMoRE, supra note 4, § 1422.
8. Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 243-47. See, e.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Union As-
surance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 394-98 (5th Cir. 1961); Perry v. Parker, 101 N.H. 295, 141 A.2d 883,
884-85(1958).
9. Act of Jan. 2,1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at28 U.S.C.
app., FED. R. EVID. 101-1103 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
10. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). FED. R. EVID. 803(24) provides that a statement is not
excluded by the hearsay rule if it is:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) contains an identical provision for a statement by.a person who is unavailable
to testify as a witness.
Of the twenty-two states that have adopted evidence rules modeled after the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, sixteen have adopted discretionary exceptions. See 4 J. WEiNsTEiN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EvIDENCE 803(24)[02], 804(b)(5)[02] (1981 & Supp. 1982).
11. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7051, 7065; FED. R. EvID. 803(24) advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183,320 (1972).
12. See Aronson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Model For Improved Evidentiary Decision-
making.in Washington, 54 WASH. L. REv. 31, 37-43 (1978); Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 247-52.
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enumerated exceptions causes some evidence that is both necessary and
trustworthy to be excluded while untrustworthy evidence of low probative
value is admitted. 13 Second, without discretionary exceptions, trial
judges are forced to "torture" the defined hearsay exceptions "beyond
any reasonable circumstances which they were intended to include."' 14
Finally, discretionary exceptions merely preserve the power judges had at
common law before adoption of rules of evidence. 15
Conversely, critics argue against discretionary exceptions on a number
of grounds. First, different trial judges may reach different conclusions
regarding the reliability of a statement, making trial preparation diffi-
cult. 16 Second, it may not be clear whether an affirmance of a discretion-
ary hearsay ruling by an appellate court creates a new hearsay exception
with the force of precedent or means merely that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion. 17 Third, the problem of seemingly reliable hearsay
evidence that does not meet the technical requirements of any defined
exception may be dealt with more effectively by construing defined ex-
ceptions broadly. 18
The Washington Supreme Court was persuaded by the arguments
against discretionary exceptions when it adopted evidence rules modeled
after the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1979.19 Consequently, Washing-
ton's rules of evidence contain no discretionary exceptions. 20 Prior to
adoption of the rules, Washington courts could admit hearsay that did not
fall within any established hearsay exception based upon a judicial deter-
mination that the evidence was reliable. 21 By adopting the rules without
discretionary exceptions, the Washington Supreme Court removed the
13. See Aronson, supra note 12, at 41; Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV
331. 344-45 (1961); McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A. J. 507, 512 (1938).
14. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG &
AD NEWS 7051, 7065; lmwinkelried, supra note 7, at 250.
15. Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 243-47.
16. See WASH R. EVID. 803(b) task force comment; Lehman, Technical Rules of Evidence, 26
COLUst L. REV. 509, 512 (1926); Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket,
14VAND L. REV 741,776(1961).
17. WASH. R. EvID 803(b) task force comment.
18. Id.
19. See WASH R. EviD 803(b) task force comment; Orland & Tegland, The Federal Rules of
Evidence: Washington Follows the Federal Model, 15 GoNz. L. REV 277, 418-20 (1980).
20. See WASH R. Ev1D 803(b) task force comment; Orland & Tegland, supra note 19, at
418-20.
21. See Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75 Wn. 2d 629, 631-35. 453
P.2d 619, 621-24 (1969) (publication of private trade association that contained standards for con-
struction of portable metal ladders admissible because its "trustworthiness ... was established be-
yond any reasonable cavil" and because of the impracticality of calling all of the preparers of the
publication as witnesses); State v. Canida, 4 Wn. App. 275, 277, 480 P.2d 800, 802 (1971) ("Ex-
ceptions are made to the rule excluding hearsay statements whenever reason and logic suggest their
reliability and trustworthiness.").
816
Vol. 58:813, 1983
Hearsay from Sexually Abused Children
authority of Washington trial judges to make discretionary determinations
regarding hearsay that is not within any defined hearsay exception. 22
B. The Admissibility of Statements by Sexually Abused Children Under
Defined Hearsay Exceptions
Any out-of-court statement made by a child that describes an act of
sexual abuse committed against the child is hearsay if offered to show that
the act occurred or to identify the offender. 23 Thus, prior to the new dis-
cretionary hearsay exception, such a statement was inadmissible unless it
met the requirements of a defined exception to the hearsay rule.24
Washington appellate courts generally construed existing exceptions
broadly to uphold the admission of statements made by sexually abused
children. In most cases, the courts used the "excited utterance" hearsay
exception. 25 They applied the requirements of the exception so liberally
to statements by sexually abused children that even responses to questions
asked many hours after the alleged sexual assault were sometimes
22. See WASH. R. EvID. 802 (hearsay is not admissible except as provided by court rules or
statute); WASH. R. EvIo. 803(b) task force comment.
23. See WASH. R. Evio. 801(c).
24. See WASH. R. EvID. 802.
25. The excited utterance exception allows admission of an out-of-court statement "relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition." WASH. R. Evlo. 803(a)(2); Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 9-10, 92 P.2d 1113,
1117 (1939). Excited utterances are presumed reliable because their spontaneity and the speaker's
excited state negate the inference that they could have been the product of fabrication, intervening
actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment. See State v. Canida, 4 Wn. App. 275, 277, 480 P.2d
800, 802 (1971); McCoRMICK. supra note 4, § 297.
Excited utterances are admissible without regard to whether the speaker could or actually does
testify at trial. See WASH. R. Evm. 803(a)(2). For cases upholding admission of a statement by a
sexually abused child where the child was incompetent to testify, see, e.g., Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wn.
2d 398, 405-06,457 P.2d 194, 199 (1969); State v. Bouchard, 31 Wn. App. 381, 383, 639 P.2d 761,
763 (1982); State v. Bloomstrom, 12 Wn. App. 416, 418-19, 529 P.2d 1124, 1126 (1974). For cases
upholding admission of prior statements of a sexually abused child to corroborate the child's testi-
mony, see, e.g., State v. Schimmelpfennig, 92 Wn. 2d 95, 99-100, 594 P.2d 442, 445 (1979) ("Ina-
bility of the declarant to testify is not one of the elements of the exception."); State v. Woodward, 32
Wn. App. 204, 205-08, 646 P.2d 135, 136-37 (1982).
Other hearsay exceptions under which statements by sexually abused children have been admitted
are the medical diagnosis exception, see State v. Bouchard, 31 Wn. App. 381, 384, 639 P.2d 761,
763 (1982), and the "recent fabrication" exception, see State v. Murley, 35 Wn. 2d 233, 238-39,
212 P.2d 801, 804-05 (1949). Under the medical diagnosis exception, statements that describe the
cause of any present or past symptoms or pain are admissible to the extent that they are made for the
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. See WASH. R. EVID. 803(a)(4). Under the recent fabrica-
tion exception, a victim's prior out-of-court statements consistent with his or her in-court testimony
were admissible for the purpose of rebutting a charge of recent fabrication. See State v. Murley, 35
Wn. 2d at 238, 212 P.2d at 804. Such out-of-court statements are no longer considered hearsay. See
WASH. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(ii).
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deemed excited utterances. For example, in State v. Woodward,26 the
court upheld the admission of a five-year-old rape victim's hearsay state-
ments that had been made in response to her mother's questions at least
twenty hours after the rape. 27 Taking into consideration the child's young
age, her physical condition, and the fact that she was laboring under a
threat of further violence from the defendant, the court concluded that it
was only remotely possible that she had fabricated the facts she related to
her mother. 28 Thus, despite the long time lapse between the rape and the
statement, the court found that the statement was an excited utterance.
29
C. The Admissibility of Statements by Sexually Abused Children Under
the New Exception
In child sexual abuse cases, the arguments in favor of discretionary
exceptions are more persuasive than those against them. 30 The Washing-
ton courts' broad construction of the excited utterance exception in child
sexual abuse cases exemplifies the dangers of judicial "torturing" of the
enumerated exceptions. 31 In applying the excited utterance exception in
26. 32 Wn. App. 204, 646 P.2d 135 (1982).
27. Id. at 206-07, 646 P.2d at 137.
28. Id. at 207, 646 P.2d at 137.
29. Id. In State v. Bouchard, 31 Wn. App. 381, 639 P.2d 761 (1982), the court considered
similar factors in evaluating a three-year-old sexual assault victim's statements. When the child re-
turned home from visiting her grandfather, her mother discovered that she had blood around her
lower abdominal and vaginal areas. When questioned about the blood, the child told her mother,
"'Grandpa did it." The court found that this statement qualified as an excited utterance because the
danger of fabrication was remote in view of the child's young age and the short lapse of time between
the alleged act of sexual abuse and the child's statement. The court also pointed out that there were no
intervening events that would tend to undermine the reliability of the statement. See also State v.
Bloomstrom, 12 Wn. App. 416, 529 P.2d 1124 (1974) (eight-year-old rape victim's statements in
response to questions held admissible as excited utterances); State v. Canida, 4 Wn. App. 275, 480
P.2d 800 (1971) (six-year-old girls' responses to their mothers' questions held admissible as excited
utterances in trial for indecent exposure).
There is no reported Washington decision that overturns a trial court's admission of a statement by
a sexually abused child as an excited utterance. It is noteworthy, however, that in all reported cases
there was, in addition to the child's hearsay statements, convincing physical evidence that the child
had been sexually abused and that the defendant was most likely the person who committed the
abuse. See, e.g., State v. Bouchard, 31 Wn. App. 381, 382-83, 639 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1982) (phys-
ical condition of child; medical testimony that vaginal injury was induced by penetration with a proj-
ecting instrument; admission by defendant that child was with him when injury occurred; testimony
by defendant's son that defendant had sexually abused him several years earlier); State v. Bloom-
strom, 12 Wn. App. 416, 417-18, 529 P.2d 1124, 1125 (1974) (physical evidence of injury to child's
vagina and rectum; admission by defendant that he was alone with child when injury occurred; medi-
cal testimony that injury could have been caused by forcible rape; presence of defendant's pubic hairs
in child's underclothing).
30. For a summary of the arguments for and against discretionary hearsay exceptions, see supra
text accompanying notes 12-18.
31. See supra Part lB.
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other types of cases, courts have required spontaneity and an excited state
to ensure that the speaker had no time for reflection. 32 Yet, in a number of
child sexual abuse cases, Washington courts have used the exception to
justify admission of statements made by the victim in response to ques-
tions after considerable prodding and passage of time. 33 Such judicial
stretching of defined exceptions defeats the purpose of having only non-
discretionary hearsay exceptions. Moreover, broad construction of the
excited utterance exception to meet special needs in child sexual abuse
cases may be used as a precedent for unintended and unwarranted liberal
applications of the exception in other types of cases.
The new exception provides a more satisfactory solution to the problem
of seemingly reliable and highly relevant hearsay that is not within any
specific hearsay exception. Under the new exception, the court is not re-
quired to search for "spontaneity" or an excited state if other equally
strong indicia of reliability are present. For this reason, the new exception
may result in a more honest and better-reasoned determination of whether
to admit a victim's statement in a child sexual abuse case.
Although the new exception gives trial courts more discretion than they
previously had under the rules of evidence, it does not give courts greater
authority than they had prior to adoption of the rules. 34 Rather, the excep-
tion merely restores the courts' pre-rule authority to make discretionary
hearsay determinations in the limited area of child sexual abuse cases.
Moreover, the discretion granted by the exception is no greater than that
actually exercised by courts through their liberal applications of the ex-
cited utterance exception even after adoption of the rules. The courts'
analyses have typically involved a consideration of a number of factors:
the time lapse between the alleged sexual assault and the child's state-
ment; physical evidence consistent with the child's statement; the circum-
stances under which the statement was made; and the age of the child. 35
The "time, content, and circumstances" criteria of the new exception,
together with the requirement that there be corroborative evidence if the
child is unavailable, are the substantial equivalent of these factors.
The criticisms that have been directed toward discretionary exceptions
do not apply to the new exception. First, the new exception is more likely
to facilitate preparation for child sexual abuse trials than to make it more
difficult. Previously, defense counsel had no assurance that the prosecu-
32. See Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 9-10, 92 P.2d 1113, 1118 (1939); McCoRMICK, supra note
4, § 297, at 706 (application of excited utterance exception to statement made 14 hours after exciting
event considered extreme); FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 304
(1972).
33. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
819
Washington Law Review
tion would not offer a sexually abused child's statement even if it did not
meet the technical requirements of the excited utterance exception. If the
statement were offered, defense counsel had no way to predict how far
the court might be willing to stretch the excited utterance exception in
order to admit it. Under the new exception, it may still be difficult to
predict whether the court will decide that a child's statement is reliable
and thus admissible. The defendant will, however, at least receive notice
of the prosecution's intention to offer the statement far enough in advance
of trial so that defense counsel can prepare to challenge the reliability of
the statement. 36
Second, the new exception will not create confusion regarding the ef-
fect of appellate decisions that affirm a trial court's admission of evidence
under the exception. Because Washington courts no longer have the au-
thority to create hearsay exceptions, such decisions will plainly have pre-
cedential value only with respect to evidence offered under the exception
in child sexual abuse cases. Thus, rather than creating confusion, appel-
late decisions will likely provide needed guidance to trial judges in apply-
ing the elements of the new exception.
The new hearsay exception, like the traditional exceptions, is based on
indications of the reliability of a statement. Although it gives trial judges
the discretion to determine the factors that guarantee reliability, it does
not present the difficulties that have previously been encountered with
more general discretionary exceptions. Thus, the new exception is an ap-
propriate solution to the special hearsay problems that arise in child sex-
ual abuse cases.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW EXCEPTION
Because Washington's new hearsay exception permits the introduction
of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings, it is open to constitutional
attack on the ground that it contravenes the defendant's sixth amendment
right to confront the witnesses against him or her.
A. The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.' 37 The purpose of the con-
36. See WASH- REV. CODE § 9A.44.120.
37. U.S. CONsT amend. VI. The confrontation clause applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). The Washington State Constitution confers
Vol. 58:813, 1983
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frontation clause is to assure that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of statements offered into evidence. 38 In defining
the right of confrontation, the United States Supreme Court has stressed
two factors: (1) the presence of the witness at the trial39 and (2) an oppor-
tunity for the defendant to cross-examine the witness. 40 The witness's
presence enables the jury to observe the witness's demeanor as an aid in
evaluating his or her credibility. 41 It also decreases the likelihood that the
witness will falsely accuse the defendant, because the witness must testify
under oath and in the defendant's presence. 42 Cross-examination allows
the defendant an opportunity to test the credibility of the witness's testi-
mony. 43
Construed literally, the confrontation clause would exclude all hearsay
evidence in criminal proceedings. 44 However, the clause is not abso-
lute. 45 While confrontation is a fundamental element of a fair trial, the
right to confrontation must sometimes yield to overriding public policy
considerations .46
Most evidence that meets the requirements of a recognized hearsay ex-
ception is admissible without confrontation because of its presumed
trustworthiness. 47 Nevertheless, the hearsay rule and the confrontation
clause are not coextensive. 48 Thus, a statement may be admissible under
a hearsay exception but still be inadmissible because of the confrontation
clause. 49 Conversely, admission of evidence by misapplication of a hear-
say exception does not necessarily violate the confrontation clause.50
The United States Supreme Court has refused to develop a theory by
a similar right. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face .... ").
38. Califomniav. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-58, 160-61 (1970).
39. See id. at 155-59; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721, 725 (1968); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
40. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,315-16 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418
(1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,406-07 (1965).
41. McCORMICK, supra note 4, § 252.
42. Id.
43. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
44. Ohiov. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
45. Id. at 62-64.
46. Id. at 64; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
47. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 252.
48. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
49, See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
50. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (court properly admitted out-of-court state-
ments made by conspirator against his fellow conspirator during concealment phase of the conspir-
acy, even though the statement would have been inadmissible under traditional conspiracy excep-
tion); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (court properly admitted prior inconsistent statement
of witness as substantive evidence where witness was given opportunity to explain or deny prior
statement, even though prior statement would be inadmissible under traditional hearsay exceptions).
Washington Law Review Vol. 58:813, 1983
which the constitutionality of each hearsay exception may be tested. 51
Instead, courts have examined the constitutionality of specific applica-
tions of individual hearsay exceptions on a case-by-case basis. 52 It is gen-
erally acknowledged that the confrontation clause does not bar out-of-
court statements made by a person who testifies at trial and can be fully
and effectively cross-examined. 53 On the other hand, the defendant's
right to confrontation may be violated if (1) the person who made the
statement does not testify at trial, or (2) the person testifies but cannot be
fully and effectively cross-examined. 54
1. Confrontation Clause Requirements If the Witness Does Not Testify
In Ohio v. Roberts,55 the United States Supreme Court established a
two-part test for determining whether admission of out-of-court state-
ments of a witness who does not testify at trial violates the defendant's
right to confrontation. First, the witness must be unavailable. 56 Second,
the witness's out-of-court statements must have "adequate 'indicia of re-
liability.' '"57
The unavailability requirement ensures that the defendant will have
face-to-face confrontation whenever possible. 58 Because of the strong
preference for face-to-face accusation, the constitutional definition of
"unavailable" is stricter than the evidentiary definition. 59 Rules of evi-
51. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
162(1970).
52. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-77 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
153-70 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403-08 (1965).
53. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). The confrontation clause requires only
an opportunity for full and effective cross-examination. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70 (1980);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168 (1970). If the defendant is given such an opportunity but fails
to take advantage of it, a complaint that the defendant's right to confrontation has been violated by
virtue of insufficient cross-examination must fail. See Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 843 (1981).
54. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 161.
55. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
56. Id. at 65. But see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (court found value of trial con-
frontation so remote that it did not require prosecution to produce apparently available witness).
57. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
58. ld. at 65.
59. The Washington Rules of Evidence define "unavailability" to include situations in which the
declarant:
(1) Is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning
the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an
order of the court to do so; or
(3) Testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical
or mental illness or infirmity; or
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dence typically provide that a witness is "unavailable" if he or she does
not respond to process. 60 A witness is "unavailable" for constitutional
purposes, however, only if the prosecution has made a good-faith effort
to obtain his or her presence at trial. 61
The "indicia of reliability" requirement ensures that a statement is suf-
ficiently trustworthy so that cross-examining the person who made the
statement would not significantly aid the jury in evaluating the state-
ment's reliability. 62 The United States Supreme Court has not specifically
defined the term "indicia of reliability." Rather, the determination of re-
liability has been made on a case-by-case basis. 63
A number of courts have examined the indicia of reliability of out-of-
court statements of sexually abused children. 64 In United States v. Nick, 65
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not vio-
lated the confrontation clause by admitting statements that a three-year-
old sexual assault victim had made to his mother. 66 The court found that
the statements had the requisite indications of trustworthiness because:
(1) the childish terminology of the statement had a "ring of verity" and
was entirely appropriate to a young child; (2) there was physical evidence
on the child and his apparel to corroborate his statements; (3) the state-
ments were made while the child was still suffering pain and distress from
the assault; (4) the child's statements to his mother were directly respon-
sive to her questions; (5) extrinsic evidence established that the defendant
(5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure
his attendance.., by process or other reasonable means.
WASH. R. EvID. 804(a).
The rules also state that "[a] declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal,
claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the propo-
nent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying."
60. See, e.g., WASH. R. EVtD. 804(a)(5); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
61. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
"'The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness... is a question of reasonable-
ness.' " Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189, n.22
(1970)). If no possibility of procuring the witness exists, good faith may demand nothing of the
prosecution; however, if there is even a remote possibility that affirmative measures might produce
the witness, good faith may demand that the measures be taken. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74.
62. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. Reliability can be inferred if the statement falls
within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. at 66. If the statement is not within a well-estab-
lished hearsay exception, the evidence is admissible only upon a showing of "particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness." Id.
63. See, e.g., id. at 67-73; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-90 (1970); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976).
64. One court held that the confrontation clause in a state constitution did not apply to a young
rape victim's out-of-court statements because the right extends only to "witnesses," not victims. See
State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 394 P.2d 196, 200, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 949 (1964).
65. 604 F.2d 1199(9th Cir. 1979).
66. Id. at 1202-04.
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had the opportunity to commit the assault; and (6) the child knew the
defendant and was thus unlikely to mistake his identity. 67 In People v.
Orduno 68 and Purdy v. State,69 the courts upheld the admission of a sexu-
ally abused child's statements over confrontation clause objections based
on similar indications of reliability.7 0
2. Full and Effective Cross-Examination of a Witness Who Testifies
Even if a witness testifies at trial, admission of the witness's out-of-
court statements may violate a defendant's right to confrontation if the
witness is not subject to "full and effective cross-examination."- 71 The
cases define no general test of what constitutes full and effective cross-
examination. 72 Instead, the determination is made on a case-by-case
basis. 73
The Washington Supreme Court has stated that full cross-examination
is particularly important in a prosecution for a sex crime. 74 In State v.
67. Id. at 1204.
68. 80 Cal. App. 3d 738. 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978). cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979).
69. 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977).
70. In Orduno. three factors indicated the reliability of the child's statement: (1) the child had
firsthand knowledge concerning what was done to her: (2) there was independent evidence, including
the defendant's testimony, that the child was with the defendant when the molestation allegedly oc-
curred: and (3) the statements were spontaneous and uttered immediately after the child left the defen-
dant's apartment. People v. Orduno. 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 746-48. 145 Cal. Rptr. 806. 811-12
(1978), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 1074 (1979). The indicia of reliability in Purdy were: (1) corrobora-
tive evidence of the physical condition of the child, and (2) eyewitness testimony that the defendant
was lying naked in the room where the child was found immediately after the child had been as-
saulted. Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977).
In another decision. State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). a court found
insufficient indicia of reliability to overcome a confrontation clause objection to admission of an out-
of-court statement by a five-year-old girl to her mother identifying her assailant. Id. at 833. Medical
testimony conclusively established that the girl had been raped. Id. at 831. However. the testimony
indicated that the rape could have occurred after the child was removed from the custody of the
defendant by her stepfather. Id. at 833.
71. See, e.g. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626-30 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149. 158-59. 168-70 (1970); Mayes v. Sowders, 621 F.2d 850, 853-56 (6th Cir.), cert. denied. 449
U.S. 922 (1980); 5A K. TEGLAND. WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 355 (2d ed. 1982). One court has held
that a defendant's right to confront a child who testifies against him or her may be violated even if full
and effective cross-examination is possible if the child and the defendant are positioned in such a way
that they cannot see each other during the child's testimony or cross-examination. See Herbert v.
Superior Ct., 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981). The court's basis for the decision
was that the defendant has a right to face-to-face confrontation. Face-to-face confrontation gives the
trier of fact one method by which to determine the veracity of the child's testimony. Id. at 855.
72. K. TEGLAND. supra note 71, § 355.
73. Id. See, e.g.. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622,626-30 (1971); Mayes v. Sowders. 621 F.2d
850. 852-56 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980).
74. See State v. Roberts, 25 Wn. App. 830, 834-35, 611 P.2d 1297, 1300-01 (1980); State v.
Peterson, 2 Wn. App. 464,466-67,469 P.2d 980. 981-82 (1970).
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Peterson,75 a rape case, the court explained that the latitude permitted in
cross-examination should be at least sufficient to permit the defendant to
show lack of credibility or motive for misrepresentation. 76 Accordingly,
in State v. Roberts,77 the court held that the trial judge had violated the
defendant's right to cross-examine the thirteen-year-old victim of an al-
leged rape by preventing the defendant from pursuing a theory that the
girl's testimony was motivated by pressure from her parents to cooperate
with the prosecutor. 78
If the defendant's opportunity for cross-examination is insufficient be-
cause of the youth of the child, the child is considered constitutionally
"unavailable.' '79 In such a case, the child's out-of-court statement will
be admissible upon a determination by the trial judge that there are suffi-
cient indicia of reliability of the child's statement, despite the lack of full
and effective cross-examination. 80
B. The Confrontation Clause and the New Hearsay Exception for
Statements by Sexually Abused Children
Washington's new hearsay exception incorporates the requirements of
Ohio v. Roberts. An out-of-court statement is admissible under the excep-
tion only if the child is unavailable and the statement has "sufficient indi-
cia of reliability." 81 For this reason, the exception is not unconstitutional
per se.82 Nevertheless, it may be applied in an unconstitutional manner.
75. 2 Wn. App. 464, 469 P.2d 980 (1970).
76. Id. at 466-67,469 P.2d at 981.
77. 25 Wn. App. 830, 611 P.2d 1297 (1980).
78. Id. at 834-36, 611 P.2d at 1300-01.
79. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 87 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981).
80. For example, in United States v. Iron Shell, a nine-year-old sexual assault victim was unable
to repeat on cross-examination statements that she had previously made to her doctor and a police
officer. The court held that admission of these statements did not violate the defendant's confronta-
tion right. The court based its decision on an assumption that the child was "unavailable" for consti-
tutional purposes in that she was too young to be subjected to thorough cross-examination. United
States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 87, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981). The court then determined
that the statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability, presumably based on the circumstances under
which they were made and the physical and mental condition of the child.
81. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120.
82. Although the exception does not specifically require full and effective cross-examination if
the child testifies, this does not make it unconstitutional per se. A person who testifies is normally
subject to cross-examination by the opposing party. The new exception does not restrict this right.
See infra Part 11 B2.
Arguably, no hearsay exception is unconstitutional per se unless no possible application of the
exception would meet the Roberts requirements. For example, an exception would be unconstitutional
on its face if it permitted admission of an out-of-court statement in a criminal trial only if the person who
made the statement were available as a witness but was not asked to testify. No application of such an
exception would be constitutional. In cases of an exception that may be applied in either a
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Courts should examine specific applications of the new exception on a
case-by-case basis, as they do with other hearsay exceptions, to deter-
mine whether the confrontation clause has been violated. 83 The analysis
will differ depending on whether or not the child testifies.
1. Child Does Not Testify
If a child's statement is offered under the new exception and the child
does not testify, the constitutional requirements of "unavailability" and
"adequate indicia of reliability" must be satisfied. A child is unavailable
for constitutional purposes if the trial court determines that the child is
incompetent to testify. 84 A child is also unavailable for constitutional pur-
poses if the child has died, 85 cannot be found despite a search with due
diligence, 86 or cannot attend the trial due to physical disability. 87 Al-
though physical absence from the courtroom is not essential to a determi-
nation of unavailability, 88 a child is not "unavailable" for constitutional
purposes merely because he or she is too nervous or frightened to tes-
tify. 89
In order to meet the reliability requirement, a child's statement must
have guarantees of trustworthiness similar to those found in United States
constitutional or unconstitutional manner, however, the exception itself should not be deemed uncon-
stitutional. Rather, the case-by-case approach established by the United States Supreme Court should
be used to test specific applications of the exception for confrontation clause violations. See supra
notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text; United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976). Courts have used a case-by-case analysis to test
the constitutionality of admission of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), which, like
the new exception, contains requirements similar to those in Roberts. In responding to confrontation
clause objections to evidence admitted under the rule, courts have not considered whether the excep-
tion itself might be unconstitutional. Rather, they have examined the application of the exception in
the case at issue to determine whether the defendant's confrontation right was violated. See, e.g..
United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 960-65 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d
624, 626-28 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d
1141, 1143-46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131.
1136-38 (4th Cir. 1978).
84. Lancaster v. People, 615 P.2d 720, 723 (Colo. 1980).
85. See, e.g.. United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981); Lenza v. Wyrick,
665 F.2d 804, 811 (8th Cir. 1981).
86. See. e.g.. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183, 1186
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 843 (1981).
87. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 253.
88. See State v. Solomon, 5 Wn. App. 412, 416-17, 487 P.2d 643, 646 (1971) (witness who
was present at trial was nevertheless "'unavailable" for confrontation clause purposes because he
invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
89. See Vasquez v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 376, 167 S.W.2d 1030, 1032 (1942).
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v. Nick,90 Purdy v. State,91 and People v. Orduno.92 To ensure that the
statement is not admitted without the requisite guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, the hearing requirement in the new hearsay exception should be
construed broadly. 93 The exception requires that the court hold a hearing
on the issue of reliability prior to admission of the statement. At the very
least, the court should thoroughly question the person who will testify
concerning the child's out-of-court statement, any other persons who
heard the statement, any persons who have knowledge of the circum-
stances surrounding the alleged sexual assault, and, if possible, the child.
During the questioning, the court should attempt to determine: (1) the
time lapse between the alleged sexual act and the child's recital of the
statement; (2) whether the statement was made in response to a leading
question; (3) whether either the child or the hearsay witness has any bias
against the defendant or any motive for fabricating the statement or impli-
cating the accused; (4) whether the statement was made while the child
was still upset or in pain because of the incident; (5) whether the terminol-
ogy of the statement was likely to have been used by a child the age of the
alleged victim; and (6) whether any event that occurred between the time
of the alleged act and the time the statement was made could have ac-
counted for the contents of the statement. In all cases, the court should
require corroborative evidence showing that the defendant had the oppor-
tunity to commit the crime and that the physical condition of the child is
consistent with his or her out-of-court statement. 94
The court should insist on even stronger corroborative evidence if the
child is incompetent to testify. A court's decision that a child is incompe-
tent as a witness is based on a finding that the child is incapable of receiv-
ing accurate impressions and relating them correctly. 95 If a child is too
90. 604 F.2d 1199(9th Cir. 1979), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 65-67.
91. 343 So. 2d 4, 7 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977), discussed supra in note 70 and
accompanying text.
92. 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979), dis-
cussed supra in note 70 and accompanying text.
93. The exception does not describe the type of hearing that is required. A broad construction of
the hearing requirement is necessary to guard against the use of ex parte or summary proceedings to
make hearsay determinations under the exception.
94. The new exception specifically requires corroborative evidence only if the child is unavail-
able. See WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.120.
95. See WASH. R. CRIM. P. 6.12(c). Determination of the competency of a child lies within the
discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 70 Wn. 2d 690, 692, 424 P.2d 1021, 1022
(1967); State v. Ridley, 61 Wn. 2d 457, 459, 378 P.2d 700, 702 (1963). Trial courts have based
competency determinations under WASH R. CRIM. P. 6.12(c) and a similar provision in WASH. REV.
COoE § 5.60.050 on whether a child (1) understands his or her obligation to speak the truth on the
witness stand; (2) had sufficient mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he or
she will testify in order to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) has a memory sufficient to retain an
independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) has the capacity to express in his or her own words
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young to describe an alleged sexual assault accurately in court, the child
is arguably also too young to describe the assault accurately out of
court.96 For this reason, a statement of a child who is incompetent to
testify should be admitted only if convincing corroborative evidence indi-
cates that the child was sexually assaulted and that the defendant was the
only person who had a reasonable opportunity to commit the crime. 97
In the case of conflicting or questionable evidence regarding the al-
leged act of sexual assault or the reliability of the child's statement, it
may be appropriate to hold a full adversary hearing to determine whether
the statement is reliable. At such a hearing, defense counsel could cross-
examine the person who will testify concerning the hearsay statement and
both sides could present evidence. Any substantial doubts concerning re-
liability should be resolved in favor of the defendant because of the im-
portance of the confrontation right and the highly prejudicial effect of a
child's statement. 98
2. Child Testifies
An out-of-court statement by a child who testifies at trial should be
admitted under the new exception only if the defendant is given an oppor-
tunity to fully and effectively cross-examine the child. A child who testi-
fies at trial is on the same footing as any other witness with respect to
cross-examination. 99 The trial court determines the scope and extent of
cross-examination, and great latitude is usually allowed. 100
the memory of the occurrence; and (5) has the capacity to understand simple questions about the
occurrence. See. e.g.. State v. Allen, 70 Wn. 2d 690, 692. 424 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1967); State v.
Johnson, 28 Wn. App. 459. 460, 624 P.2d 213, 214 (1981), aff d, 96 Wn. 2d 926. 639 P.2d 1332
(1982).
96. See State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 41 A.2d 101, 103 (1945); Stafford, The Child As a
W'itness. 37 WASH. L. REV 303, 307 (1962). It would be anomalous to permit a competent witness to
repeat a child's statement to the jury when all statements made by that child are so presumptively
unreliable that the child cannot be permitted to make the same statement directly to the jury.
97. Examples of corroborative evidence that would meet this test are (1) medical testimony es-
tablishing the time of the sexual assault, together with convincing circumstantial evidence that the
defendant was the only person with the child at that time, or (2) eyewitness testimony that the defen-
dant committed the sexual assault. Such corroborative evidence rebuts the presumption that the par-
ticular statement offered did not accurately describe the assault. This precludes the possibility that a
defendant might be convicted solely on the basis of an out-of-court statement of a child who is inca-
pable of accurately perceiving or describing events.
98. See State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (defendant's confron-
tation right was violated by admission of child's statement that defendant had raped her, where cir-
cumstantial evidence indicated that the rape could have been committed by either the defendant or the
child's stepfather, and no other evidence implicated the defendant).
99 Stafford, supra note 96, at 321.
100. Id.
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If the trial judge restricts a defendant's right to cross-examine a child or
cross-examination is ineffective due to lack of cooperation from the wit-
ness, the defendant's confrontation right may be violated. If the ineffec-
tive cross-examination is a result of the youth of the child, the child's out-
of-court statement may be admissible over confrontation clause objec-
tions if the statement has adequate indicia of reliability. 101 In all other
cases, the defendant's confrontation right should at least include the op-
portunity during cross-examination to expose any lack of credibility and
any motive the child may have had to fabricate his or her out-of-court
statement.
III. CONCLUSION
Washington's new statutory hearsay exception will eliminate the need
to force out-of-court statements made by sexually abused children within
the requirements of the excited utterance exception. Instead, courts may
determine the reliability of statements by evaluating all relevant factors,
including corroborative evidence.
Because the exception incorporates the requirements set forth in Ohio
v. Roberts, it is not unconstitutional per se. Nevertheless, specific appli-
cations of the exception may be unconstitutional if the trial court fails to
use proper criteria and procedures to evaluate reliability. The determina-
tion of whether a specific application of the exception violates a defen-
dant's confrontation right should be made on a case-by-case basis, in the
same manner that the constitutionality of specific applications of other
hearsay exceptions is tested.
Sheryl K. Peterson
101. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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